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Abstract
The use of short text messages in social
media and instant messaging has become
a popular communication channel during
the last years. This rising popularity has
caused an increment in messaging threats
such as spam, phishing or malware as well
as other threats. The processing of these
short text message threats could pose ad-
ditional challenges such as the presence of
lexical variants, SMS-like contractions or
advanced obfuscations which can degrade
the performance of traditional filtering so-
lutions. By using a real-world SMS data
set from a large telecommunications oper-
ator from the US and a social media cor-
pus, in this paper we analyze the effective-
ness of machine learning filters based on
linguistic and behavioral patterns in order
to detect short text spam and abusive users
in the network. We have also explored dif-
ferent ways to deal with short text message
challenges such as tokenization and entity
detection by using text normalization and
substring clustering techniques. The ob-
tained results show the validity of the pro-
posed solution by enhancing baseline ap-
proaches.
1 Introduction
During the last years the use of short text messages
in social media and instant messaging has become
a powerful communication channel where users
can exchange information, connect and share links
with each other. As happens with another popular
platforms such as email we have witnessed an in-
crement on messaging threats such as spam (i.e.,
advertising or affiliate campaigns), scam (i.e., fi-
nancial fraud), phishing (i.e., attacks with aim to
steal sensitive information) and the spread of mali-
cious software (i.e., worms, ransomware, spyware
or Trojan horses) between others (Grzonkowski
et al., 2014). While these share common fea-
tures with campaigns seen on email such as the
use of an URL or phone number as a call-to-
action, short text message spam usually lack server
and metadata-rich information. Also messages are
very brief due to size restriction to a few number
of characters and do not always contain spammy
keywords e.g “This is the thing that I told u about
http://xxxxx”. Because of the real-time nature of
these conversations and the need to process a high
volume of data there are additional performance
restrictions that can limit the analysis time. For ex-
ample, SMS messages cannot be delayed in most
of the cases for more than a few seconds, so taking
into account that some campaigns are active just
for some minutes a very fast response is needed
in order to block these threats in time. Because
all these features short text message spam can be
challenging for traditional filtering solutions (Cor-
mack, 2008). Also, the presence of obfuscations,
lexical variants or wordplay and the absence of
an explicit call-to-action can cause that the same
short message can categorized as malicious or not
depending on the context e.g. “I’ve met you last
night call me back”. This may degrade the perfor-
mance of machine learning filters, requiring some
degree of adaptation.
One of the biggest handicaps that the scientific
community has faced regarding this topic is the
limited availability of public short text message
spam datasets mainly because of privacy and legal
reasons. Another existing limitation is that these
usually do not contain additional metadata such
as sender and recipient identifiers, time stamp or
network information. For this reason it is difficult
to test and evaluate of possible filtering solutions
without a real-world scenario.
Using a real-world Short Messaging Service
(SMS) data set from a large telecommunications
operator from the US, we analyze the effectiveness
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of machine learning filters based on linguistic pat-
terns in order to detect and stop short text spam.
Because textual features alone can generate false-
positives in some situations such as forwarded
messages or messages with ambiguous URLs, we
evaluate the combination of behavioral and lin-
guistic information in order to develop more ro-
bust models for detecting malicious users in the
network. We also study the use of the same ap-
proaches for social media spam filtering (comment
spam) and the contribution of text normalization
techniques to the performance of the proposed so-
lutions.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section
1 we show the related work, then in Section 2
our combined model for detecting spammers using
linguistic and behavioral patters are explained, the
used datasets are introduced in Section 3, the ex-
perimental results are described in Section 4, Sec-
tion 5 contains the discussion of the results and
in Section 4 we draw the conclusions and propose
future work.
2 Related Work
Most of the first studies about short text message
abuse are related with SMS spam where initial
analyses focused on content analysis (Go´mez Hi-
dalgo et al., 2006) based on n-gram and text count
features (Cormack et al., 2007b), (Cormack et al.,
2007a) using machine learning algorithms. The
best classification results for SMS were obtained
with support vector machines (SVM) with a 0.95
AUC.
Another content-based approaches for SMS
spam used pattern matching (Liu et al., 2010),
near-duplicate detection (Coskun and Giura,
2012), (Valle´s and Rosso, 2011), byte-level fea-
tures (Rafique and Farooq, 2010), evolutionary al-
gorithms (Rafique et al., 2011) and feature se-
lection based on information gain and chi-square
metrics (Uysal et al., 2012).
About studies using an specific deployment
platform we can highlight the work of Narayan
and Saxena(2013) where they analyzed the perfor-
mance of spam filtering apps in Android and pro-
posed a combination of Bayesian and SVM classi-
fiers evaluated on a corpus of 700 messages.
Regarding non-content features the use of the
grey phone space has been applied in order to de-
tect spammers targeting randomly generated sub-
scriber phone numbers (Jiang et al., 2013). Ad-
ditional metadata such as sender location, network
usage and call detail records have been shown use-
ful for mining behavioral patters of SMS spam-
mers (Murynets and Piqueras Jover, 2012). Also,
both sending and temporal features such as mes-
sage and recipient counts per specified periods of
time (Wang et al., 2010), (Xu et al., 2012) can be
used in order to detect abusive SMS senders in mo-
bile networks using a probabilistic model.
Regarding the use of content and behavioral fea-
tures on social networks for spam filtering Ben-
evenuto et. al (2010) proposed a machine learn-
ing model in order to detect spammers in Twitter
with almost a 70% success rate. Using features
based on profile metadata Lee et. al (2010) stud-
ied the discovery of social media spam in Twit-
ter and MySpace with a 0.88 and 0.99 F1 respec-
tively in order to create a social honeypot. Us-
ing a different approach based on sending patterns
and targeting strategies Youtube comment spam
campaigns were tracked by using network analysis
(O’Callaghan et al., 2012).
Most of these works were evaluated on small
text spam collections (Almeida et al., 2011), (Hi-
dalgo et al., 2012) which can not be always rep-
resentative if we take into account the fast chang-
ing nature of short text message spam campaigns.
Also, these static datasets do not contain informa-
tion about senders, recipients, network or addi-
tional metadata such as URL information, which
can be relevant for filtering purposes. For this
reason, in this paper we explore the problem of
short text spam filtering on a live SMS feed from
a large telecommunications operator from the US
and we evaluate the performance of different fil-
tering techniques.
3 Modelling Linguistic and Behavioral
Patterns
Machine learning is a branch of Artificial Intel-
ligence (AI) that allow computers to learn pat-
terns and take decisions based on data. Because
machine learning has been proved successful for
text categorization tasks (Sebastiani, 2002) such as
topic detection (Ghiassi et al., 2012) or spam email
filtering (Gu¨nal et al., 2006) supervised machine
learning models have been trained in order to auto-
matically classify SMS senders using the features
extracted from the training data. Because fight-
ing spam is a success story of real-world machine
learning we have trained a combined model us-
ing random forests (Breiman, 2001) based on two
systems: one using lexical patterns and based on
message linguistic analysis (MELA) and another
leveraging behavioral information using messag-
ing pattern analysis (MPA) in order to identify
short text message spammers using mobile net-
works.
3.1 Message Linguistic Analysis: MELA
Short text message spam on platforms such as
SMS, instant messaging (IM) or microblogs usu-
ally contain an URL or phone number as an ex-
plicit call-to-action (CTA) in order to get con-
versions and monetize the campaign e.g. “Your
credit card has been BLOCKED please visit
http://xxxxxx.xx to reactivate”. But this CTA can
be also implicit “Are you tired of money problems?
reply for a payday loan today” thus making tradi-
tional filtering techniques such as URL or phone
number reputation less effective against these type
of threats.
Previous approaches (Cormack et al., 2007b),
(Cormack et al., 2007a) used traditional n-gram
features based on shallow natural language pro-
cessing (NLP) techniques such as tokenization or
lemmatization. However, the word-vector space
model (WVSM) can be quite sensible to outliers
generated by new spam campaigns and it can gen-
erate models with a high dimensionality due to the
presence of lexical variants and intentionally ob-
fuscated elements when training on big datasets.
We have identified several spam campaigns show-
ing some of these features thus making standard
tokenization and entity detection techniques use-
less (see Table 1).
For this reason and also because the relatively
high amount of training data that we were using
in comparison with state of the art approaches for
SMS spam (600k messages) we decided to do not
use a word vector space model. Instead we have
clustered substring tokens from a subset of 100k
messages using t-distributed stochastic neighbor
embeddings (t-SNE) (van der Maaten and Hinton,
2008), string similarity functions based on match-
ing n-grams and word co-occurrences. These sub-
string tokens were mined from spam messages by
taking into account the longest common substrings
(LCS) of the most frequent words in the dataset
after removing stopwords. The resulting 22 sub-
string clusters were obtained after manually prun-
ing the embeddings in order to remove bad-quality
or non-relevant groups (see Table 2). Because the
languages of these initial subset of SMS messages
were mostly in English (95%) and Spanish (2%),
the extracted substrings will reflect that lexical va-
riety.
These substrings will generate vector counts
for each cluster by using the Aho-Corasick algo-
rithm (Aho and Corasick, 1975). Entities such
as URLs, emails and phone numbers are identi-
fied and extracted. In the case of URLs these are
processed in a special way as these are one of the
preferred CTA vectors used by spammers (and in
some cases the short message will contain just an
URL) with more than a 70% of the spam messages
in our collected data. An additional feature vec-
tor will be generated for each URL and it will be
processed by a separate classifier, converting the
output of these results into MELA features (DO-
MAIN MELASCORE).
After analyzing textual patterns of short text
spam messages we have identified 51 linguistic
features that can be grouped into three differ-
ent categories by taking into account their nature:
Entity-based, Heuristic and Structural (see Table
3).
3.1.1 Entity Features
Besides basic entity counts (NUM OF URLS,
NUM OF PHONES and NUM OF EMAILS)
we have also identified temporal ex-
pressions (NUM OF TIMEX), numbers
(NUM OF NUMBER) and currency men-
tions (NUM OF CURRENCY). Because URLs
and especially domain names registered by
spammers usually contain semantic and lexical
patterns, we have processed them individually
by using a subset of MELA features plus ad-hoc
heuristics. We have observed that domain names
in English serving the same campaigns had a high
overlap of substring n-grams, which those can be
characterized by using the previously obtained
substring clusters (see Figure 1).
3.1.2 Heuristic Features
Several heuristic features has been added in or-
der to detect linguistic patterns commonly seen in
short text spam campaign (ENDS WITH NUM,
CONTAINS YEAR...) to discover Twitter hash-
tags and mentions (HEUR TWEET) or to iden-
tify shortening services (DOMAIN ISSHORT),
commonly exploited free TLDs such as .tk or
.pw that are abused by spammers (BADTLDS,
Examples of incorrectly processed messages
Message: \rOtOcarr0.K0nprare/0ld/trashed/crashed up/k.a.r.s/\callus now555O5O5O5O
Tokens: [’rOtOcarr0’, ’K0nprare’, ’0ld’, ’trashed’, ’crashed’, ’up’, ’k’, ’a’, ’r’, ’s’, ’callus’, ’now555O5O5O5O’]
CTA:[none]
Problem: Incorrect tokenization and no CTA detection
Message: Hi, I want to meet you tonight, spamdomain.com.Support me
Tokens: [’Hi’, ’I’, ’want’, ’to’, ’meet’, ’you’, ’tonight’, ’spamdomain.com.Support’, ’me’
CTA:[’spamdomain.com.Support’]
Problem: Incorrect URL detection (wrong TLD)
Message: Ive had a lot of fun tonight.tk
Tokens: [’Ive’, ’had’, ’a’, ’lot’, ’of’, ’fun’, ’tonight.tk’]
CTA:[’tonight.tk’]
Problem: Incorrect URL detection (no URL)
Table 1: Examples of standard tokenization and CTA detection on obfuscated messages.
Cluster Substrings
car [auto, scrap, car, automob, coche, recycl]
job [work, job, home, employ, paid, hire, salary, trabaj, salario, casa, income]
alarm [alarm, alert, attention, danger, urgen, emergency]
event [club, ticket, party, dj, gig, concert, artist, venue, disco, bar, lounge, club, fiesta]
phishing [faceb, twitter, microsoft, paypa, twit, verizon, bank, visa, tweet, vzw, wmart, banco]
scam [craig, verif, secur, cnbc, stock, safe, trade, coin, bonus, bill, card, busine, forex, broker, biz, ebook, rich, sell]
intent [participa, redeem, choose, pick, order, llama, envia, enrol, enter, subscribe, dial, end, stop, register, read, get...]
bank [invest, wire, limit, flag, master, debit, credit, visa, account, hack, activ, block, verify, compromise, disable...]
money [cash, dollar, pound, euro, money, dinero, dolar, pesos, rupee]
... [...]
Table 2: Subset of MELA substring clusters for SMS spam.
Figure 1: Example of n-gram clustering for do-
main names serving adult affiliate campaigns.
SUSPTLDS, NORMALTLDS).
3.1.3 Structural Features
We observed campaigns that were following the
same, but slightly modified, structure with a goal
of evading detection. In order to do this they
generate textual variants of the same message us-
ing randomized templates: e.g. “Andrea, this
is what worked for his http://xxxxxxx”, “Ashley,
thats what works for you http://xxxxxxx” (see Fig-
ure 2). For this reason we have encoded the
position of different CTA entities (PHONE POS,
EMAIL POS, NUMBER POS) as a numeric vec-
tor by taking into account if these are at the begin-
ning, at the end or in the middle of the message.
3.1.4 Text Normalization
The language used in SMS messages usually can
contain informal elements such as misspellings,
slang, lexical variants and inconsistent punctua-
tion, contractions, phonetic substitutions or emoti-
cons. Spammers are aware of this peculiarities and
generate messages that are very similar to ham
by using creative variants of the original content
in order to avoid fingerprinting. Text normaliza-
tion techniques deal with out-of-vocabulary words
(OOV) by replacing these variants with canonical
ones (Aw et al., 2006). We have applied a text nor-
malization process based on the exception dictio-
naries of TENOR (Mosquera et al., 2012) in order
to substitute the most common English shorten-
ings and lexical variants.
3.2 Messaging Pattern Analysis: MPA
While some spammers prefer to send thousands
of messages in a short amount of time, which
can raise volumetric alerts and get them blocked
automatically, others prefer to go low volume
or split the sending process over thousands of
unique senders (Aouad et al., 2014). One of the
keys of successful spam campaigns is avoiding
Figure 2: Example of lexical variation and templates used by SMS spammers.
Message Features Domain Features
NUM OF URLS STARTS WITH NUM
NUM OF PHONES ENDS WITH NUM
NUM OF EMAILS CONTAINS 00
URL POS CONTAINS VV
PHONE POS CONTAINS YEAR
EMAIL POS CONTAINS 1
NUMBER POS CONTAINS ZERO
CONTAINS FWD DIGIT RATIO
LENGTH HYPHEN COUNT
WORD COUNT LENGTH
PHONEME COUNT WORD COUNT
SUBSTRING CLUST 0 PHONEME COUNT
... SUBSTRING CLUST 0
SUBSTRING CLUST 21 ...
UNSUBSCRIBE SUBSTRING CLUST 21
PHONE ISFREE CONTAINSWWW
EMAIL ISFREE BADTLDS
URL ISDOM SUSPTLDS
DOMAIN MELASCORE NORMALTLDS
DOMAIN ISSHORT ISSHORT
NGRAM ENTROPY
START WITHNUMBER
END WITHNUMBER
TOKEN RATIO
NUM OF TIMEX
NUM OF NUMBER
NUM OF CURRENCY
STARTSWITH HELLO
ENDSWITH CTA
DOMAIN OBFUSCATION
HEUR TWEET
Table 3: MELA domain and message features.
early detection, so reusing previous messages
or senders will not be effective if the network
has some basic level of anti-spam protection
e.g. sender/CTA reputation or a hash database
of spam messages. For this reason, we have
extracted messaging features based on sender
behavior in order to detect abusive activity in
the network by collecting information from
senders which at least send 50 messages in
a 7-day period, these values are empiric and
can be changed depending on the network and
platform. In order to do this we have collected
communication-specific metadata such as origin
and destination network and if these are US-based
or not (ORIG NETWORK, DEST NETWORK,
SENDER NETWORK IS NOT US,
DEST NETWORK IS NOT US,
NUM OF UNIQUE DEST NETWORKS).
Because spammers can target individual users
leaked from contact information databases
or randomly/uniformly-generated victims we
model also their targeting strategy. For this
reason, numeric features such as the number
of sent messages per second that differentiate
between slow and fast senders or sender num-
ber entropy, provides information about target
randomness (NUM OF UNIQUE RECIPIENTS,
SENDING FREQUENCY, RECIPI-
ENT NUMBER ENTROPY). Also, all the
MELA features for the first sent message are also
included as part of MPA (see Table 4) in order to
cover both messaging and linguistic patterns.
In Figure 3, we can observe how the 2D projec-
tion of MPA features show clear differences be-
tween legit and spammer messaging patterns that
are almost linearly separable, which depicts the
accuracy of the engineered features.
MPA Features
ORIG NETWORK
DEST NETWORK
SENDER NETWORK IS NOT US
DEST NETWORK IS NOT US
NUM OF UNIQUE RECIPIENTS
RECIPIENT NUMBER ENTROPY
NUM OF UNIQUE DEST NETWORKS
SENDING FREQUENCY
NUM OF UNIQUE MESSAGES
MELA FEATURE 0
...
MELA FEATURE 50
Table 4: MPA features.
Figure 3: 2D projection of MPA sender patterns
data.
4 Datasets
Previous studies on SMS spam used the datasets
published by (Almeida et al., 2011) and (Delany et
al., 2012). Since all these were constructed using
the NUS SMS corpus (Chen and Kan, 2011) and
Grumbletext1 after removing the duplicates the to-
tal number of messages result in less than 2500
tagged instances2 by taking into account train and
test sets. Because of the changing nature of SMS
spam campaigns a bigger dataset is needed in or-
der to create robust models.
For this reason, we have captured 300K unique
spam and 100K ham messages from a large US
telecommunications operator covering the period
from April 2013 to December 2013. Because
the number of unique ham messages were con-
siderably smaller we have balanced the corpus by
adding 200K tweets after removing all hash tags
and user mentions in order to simulate clean SMS
data. In addition we have compiled data from 40K
senders with 50 sent SMS each in a week period
1http://grumbletext.co.uk
2https://github.com/okkhoy/SpamSMSData
Precision Recall F1
Ham 0.73 1 0.84
Spam 1 0.62 0.77
avg. 0.86 0.81 0.81
Table 5: MELA domain classification results for
SMS spam.
(20K spammers and 20K legit).
We have also experimented with short message
spam from social media, in order to do this a
comment spam dataset (O’Callaghan et al., 2012)
containing 6.4M comments with 481K marked as
spam by users3 has been used.
5 Results and Evaluation
The proposed filtering models have been evalu-
ated in terms of precision, recall and the harmonic
mean of these (F1) by using a ten-fold cross vali-
dation with the datasets described in the previous
section. Two baseline systems for evaluation have
been developed by using common features such
as word n-grams and sparse orthogonal n-grams
(n=3).
For the SMS corpus on the one hand MELA re-
sults shows a 0.05% false positive (FP) rate and a
9.4% false negative (FN) rate for domain classi-
fication (see Table 7). On the other hand, results
for message classification show a 0.02% false pos-
itive (FP) rate and a 3.1% false negative (FN) rate
(see Table 6). MELA scored more than 5 F1 more
points than the baseline. We can observe how the
use of text normalization techniques can improve
both n-gram and sgram models by almost 2 F1
points.
The results obtained after analyzing the
Youtube comment spam corpus were considerably
lower not only for MELA but also for baseline ap-
proaches with a 72% F1. This means that lexi-
cal patterns are less relevant on these messages as
many of them lack of URLs and explicit CTAs.
MPA results were similar for sender classifica-
tion with a 0.08% and 3% FP and FN rates respec-
tively (see Table 8). Regarding the machine learn-
ing hyperparameters we have noticed that increas-
ing the number of trees had a positive impact in the
results, finding that n=500 was the optimal value.
No relevant improvements were found when using
a higher number of estimators.
3http://mlg.ucd.ie/files/datasets/youtube comments 20120117.csv.bz2
Features Class Precision Recall F1
Ham 0.94 1 0.97
MELA Spam 1 0.93 0.97
avg. 0.97 0.97 0.97
Ham 0.83 1 0.91
SGRAM Spam 1 0.79 0.88
avg. 0.91 0.90 0.89
Ham 0.86 1 0.92
SGRAM Spam 1 0.84 0.91
NORM. avg. 0.93 0.92 0.92
Ham 0.81 1 0.89
NGRAM Spam 1 0.75 0.86
avg. 0.90 0.88 0.88
Ham 0.82 1 0.90
NGRAM Spam 1 0.79 0.88
NORM. avg. 0.91 0.89 0.89
Table 6: Message classification results for SMS
spam.
Features Class Precision Recall F1
Ham 0.66 0.99 0.79
MELA Spam 0.98 0.48 0.64
avg. 0.82 0.73 0.72
Ham 0.65 1 0.79
SGRAM Spam 0.99 0.47 0.63
avg. 0.82 0.73 0.71
Ham 0.65 1 0.79
SGRAM Spam 0.99 0.47 0.64
NORM. avg. 0.82 0.73 0.71
Ham 0.63 1 0.77
NGRAM Spam 0.99 0.42 0.59
avg. 0.81 0.71 0.69
Ham 0.64 1 0.78
NGRAM Spam 0.99 0.45 0.62
NORM. avg. 0.82 0.72 0.70
Table 7: Message classification results for
Youtube comment spam.
Precision Recall F1
Ham 0.95 1 0.98
Spam 1 0.95 0.97
avg. 0.98 0.97 0.97
Table 8: MPA sender classification results for
SMS spam.
We have also evaluated the trained MPA model
against live SMS data from the same US telecom
operator for a 22-week period in terms of F1 and
FP rates with an average 91% and 0.058% respec-
tively (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). Taking into
account that the models have not been retrained
during the whole evaluation period these results
are quite competitive in comparison with the ones
obtained by cross validation. Spam campaigns
evolve quickly over time (Aouad et al., 2014) and
new types of messaging threats appear every day
effectively degrading MPA performance over the
time in terms of FP’s.
Figure 4: F1 score evolution for sender classifica-
tion of live SMS data during 22 weeks using the
initial MPA model.
Figure 5: False positive rate evolution for sender
classification of live SMS data during 22 weeks
using the initial MPA model.
MPA classification F1 remained more or less
constant during the whole period with the ex-
ception of the spike in the chart on week 62 to
63. There were a high number of false nega-
tive senders from an adult scam campaign target-
ing chat users: “hey babe saw youre pic online
lets chat on mssnger add me xxxxxx” during those
weeks, affecting the overall efficacy. This cam-
paign used an implicit CTA and showed a targeted-
attack pattern using recipients extracted from so-
cial media and adult dating websites. Because
the number of non-explicit CTA campaigns in the
training data was small the campaign was missed.
However these could be detected by adding them
to the dataset and retraining the model.
6 Discussion
As mentioned in the previous section, the absence
of an explicit CTA or the use of URL shorten-
ing services are some of the challenges found
during the analysis of the obtained results. Be-
cause these are present in the training data and can
generate a high number of false positives a cost-
sensitive classification was used in order to effec-
tively lowering the number of FP’s but also com-
promising spammer detection efficacy. We have
also showed how the use of simple text normal-
ization and substring clusters can generate effi-
cient and agile models suitable for real-time fil-
tering. About the first, it provided a positive but
modest contribution by pushing the F1 of message
classification further. There is still room for im-
provements on this area that will require a detailed
case-by-case analysis that we address in our fu-
ture work. Regarding the second there are obvious
advantages over standard tokenization approaches
but they also can generate false positives, which
will require further work in order to identify po-
tentially problematic cases.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we have explored the use of lexical
and behavioral patterns in order to detect threats
in short text message networks. Two different fil-
tering systems have been proposed for message
filtering and abusive sender identification. These
were evaluated using both a relatively-big static
corpus and live network data for a 22-week period.
The obtained results show the validity of the pro-
posed solution by enhancing baseline approaches.
We have also explored different ways to deal with
short text message challenges such as tokeniza-
tion and entity detection by using text normaliza-
tion and substring clustering techniques. The use
of these was found to not only slightly improve
the proposed baselines but to be as well a more
performance-wise solution.
We have identified additional data sources that
can be leveraged in order to improve the obtained
results such as the use of URL content and meta-
data, URL reputation databases and WHOIS do-
main information. The use of features based on
these and the generation of fingerprints for de-
tected campaigns are left to a future work.
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